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The absence of ‘ties meaningful’ (Ronen, 147) can easily curtail the realization of rights 
claims that are grounded ‘only’ in the need for authentic, genetic identity. Often, there is a need 
to evidence some form of ‘remembered relatedness,’ for example when seeking permission 
from jurists or government departments to access one’s original birth records or make some 
form of contact with estranged biological relatives. This paper will argue that a right to avoid 
origin deprivation—and access truths surrounding our genetic ancestry—can, in theory at 
least, be found or crafted from a number of relevant human rights provisions, not least those 
that have long served elsewhere to protect family life, familial contact, and child welfare 
paramountcy. The first half of the paper outlines how human rights frameworks might be used 
to underpin and argue the right to original identity (including persuasive Guidance in the form 
of UN Country Reports). The second half examines recent relevant jurisprudence on this area 
of law, looking particularly to the recent case law on gamete donation and surrogacy, much of 
which seems to hold increasing relevance for closed-records adoptees seeking to connect with 
their genetic relatives, even though its messages are mixed in terms of promoting the rights of 
relinquished persons.  It concludes with a discussion of some of the recent UN initiatives aimed 
at addressing the various inequities that can arise from depriving people of origin, namely, 
harsh othering and ‘orphanisation.’ 
2. Conceptualizing access to genetic ancestry as a human right: law and policy frameworks
Limited justiciability attaches to the ‘right’ to avoid origin deprivation (or, more accurately, 
genetic non-ancestry). Within human rights law however, certain entitlements to access at 
least some key aspects of genetic identity can be found. Citizens generally have the right 
to possess both name2	and nationality, given that States are duty bound to respect ‘cultural 
integrity’3 where possible. Other relevant principles and concepts include human dignity, the 
best interests of the child,4	equality, and non-discrimination,5even if domestic interpretations of 
these can differ profoundly across jurisdictions. As Sclater and Kaganas have argued, the child 
welfare paramountcy principle is particularly problematic, given the ‘myriad meanings’ that 
often tend to render it quite ‘indeterminate’ (168).  Given also that many socio-economic rights 
entitlements—such as the right to respect for home, family and private life under Article 8 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’)—are often heavily resource-dependant, 
it may be argued that these so-called entitlements seem more akin to non-juridical, finite or 
rationed privileges.
If we accept however that ‘universal protection of relationships with significant others is 
in fact protection of the distinctness and the uniqueness in the individual’ (Ronen, 151), then 
vetoes on information disclosure and contact become problematic. The Children’s Convention 
clearly aims to protect ‘authenticity’ and ‘self-realization’ of individual identity (Ronen, 149). It 
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and human dignity’. 




is noteworthy however that during its drafting stage several signatory states expressed unease 
over the inclusion of a clause on the ‘biological element’ of identity for fear it might conflict 
with future domestic policies on reproductive technologies.6	As Detrick, Doek and Cantwell 
noted, some Working Group members disliked the term ‘family identity’, preferring instead 
a much less expansive notion of ‘family relations as recognised by law’ (294). It seems that, 
rather than reaffirming a commitment to removing obstacles to ‘birth-kin repatriation’ (Brower 
Blair, 642), the Convention’s drafters avoided the creation of any positive obligation to actively 
facilitate information release (Stewart, 224). ‘Borderline or unusual conditions’ were also not 
considered, and there was little acknowledgement of the adverse consequences of living with 
genetic kinlessness (Stewart, 223).
Article 21 of the Children’s Convention framed international adoption as akin to the 
domestic sort, stressing the need for parental consents to relinquishment. Its silence on issues 
of biogenetic information release has meant however that domestic legislators and jurists must 
make hard decisions with ambiguous guidance7	and against a backdrop of an increasingly deep 
lack of consensus on such matters.8 Article 20 (1) does at least call out for ‘special protection 
and assistance by the State’ to include any children ‘temporarily or permanently deprived of … 
family environment.’ Article 20 (3) stresses the ‘desirability of continuity’ but is silent on more 
pragmatic issues such as the opportunity for reunion, and access to meaningful information. 
Arguably, the right to preserve genetic heritage could fall within this provision’s requirement 
that States have ‘due regard’ for the child’s ‘ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic 
background.’9	The Convention is not unequivocal however: its Preamble states that families are 
of ‘fundamental importance’ and stresses the need for ‘full and harmonious development of 
… personality.’10	It goes on to highlight ‘authenticity’ within a ‘cultural context (and) personal 
meaning’ (Ronen, 147) but creates no juridical duty to actively protect or realise identity rights 
for those affected by parental vetoes or genitor anonymity laws. Support for the psychological 
benefits of knowing familial origin can at least be implied to some extent: Articles 7 and 8 
speak to the significance of ‘family relations’ even if they do avoid defining relatedness.11	Article 
9 (1) allows for kin separation only where the child’s best interests require it, whilst Article 9 
(3) provides for the maintenance of ‘personal relations and direct contact,’ again unless best 
interests demand otherwise.12	The Convention fails though to define exactly which categories of 
relatedness might fall within its potentially wide remit of ‘family relationships’ (McCarthy,12). 
Article 9 (3) refers only to the need for contact between child and parents, with no mention of 
siblings or other kinfolk.13  
The presence of ‘ties meaningful’ (Ronen, 147) remains a key factor as seen recently in the 
European Court of Human Rights in Paradiso v Italy (2017), a difficult case involving surrogacy, 
adoption, and unknown genetic parentage (examined in the next section).14 Where there is 
a lack of ‘remembered relatedness’ any bonds formed by gestation and/or birth may simply 
be ignored by jurists, or seen as having withered on the vine (for want of a better analogy 
involving family trees or biological roots).15	Conversely, the absence of genetic relatedness has 
also been used to essentially justify the permanent removal of an infant from his parents (as 
in Paradiso). And yet meaningful psychological bonds are needed it seems to spark rights to 
respect for family life (under Article 8 of the European Convention). Such reasoning fails to 
take into account many key socio-cultural aspects of one’s identity which will not easily be 
‘remembered’ during infancy if one has been relinquished by birth parents and adopted out 
into another culture: ethnicity, culture, religion, and nationality can easily be lost or removed, 
as seen in ‘scoop’-led adoption practices of the past century, across a number of jurisdictions. 
6. During its drafting, only one signatory state suggested that a ‘biological element’ of identity ought to be included in the final draft of the 
Convention. See also the Report of the Working Group on a Draft Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) E/CN.4/1989/48 
7. See also The Hague Convention (1993) Art 31 which (together with Articles 15 and 16) states that any items of information ‘shall be used only for 
the purposes for which they were gathered or transmitted’. 
8. The ‘margin of appreciation’ is a doctrine referred to by enforcement/judicial bodies (such as the European Court of Human Rights) in 
determining whether signatory states have acted in breach of their Convention obligations. States are permitted varying degrees of discretion 
in carrying out certain obligations at the level of domestic compliance, especially where certain rights might be subject to a variety of differing 
interpretations by member states; factors such as religious or cultural differences will generally be taken into account, as will a lack of consensus 
over contentious issues. See further O'Donnell (1982).
  
9. Article 21 (a) deals with the issues of parental consent, inter-country adoption and the prohibition of financial gain. 
10. See The Preamble to the United Nations Convention on the Rights (‘The Children’s Convention’) of the Child, Para 5 
11. See Article 8 of The Children’s Convention which states that (1) ‘State Parties undertake to respect the right of the child to preserve his or her 
identity, including nationality, name and family relations as recognized by law without unlawful interference.’ (2) ‘Where a child is illegally 
deprived of some or all of the elements of his identity, States Parties shall provide appropriate assistance and protection, with a view to re-
establishing speedily his or her identity.’ 
12. Article 9 (4) covers the provision of information but is clearly aimed at situations involving civil or political rights violations such as ‘detention, 
imprisonment, exile deportation or death’ rather than adoption or assisted conception. See also Articles 20 (1) and 22 (2) 
 
13. Article 9 (3) states that ‘State parties shall respect the right of the child who is separated from one or both parents to maintain personal relations 
and direct contact with both parents on a regular basis, except if it is contrary to the child’s best interests.’ 
  
14. European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, (2017) Application no. 25358/12
  
15. See for example Keegan v Ireland (1994) (App no 16969/90) 18 EHRR 342; Kroon v The Netherlands (1995) 19 EHRR 263; X v Croatia (app no 
12233/04) (17.07.2008); Johansen v Norway [1996] EHRR 31 (app no 17383/90) . See however Marckx v Belgium (1979) (application no 6833/74) (1979) 




The Children’s Convention similarly places no legal obligation upon parents to inform their 
adopted or donor-conceived children of their biological heritage or indeed provide them with 
any useful information on it.
The apparent tensions between Articles 5, 12 and 13 of the Children’s Convention (on the 
child’s right to ‘be heard’ and to participate in all proceedings affecting them) reflect the 
problems attaching to child protection and identity formation more generally (Ronen, 162).16	The 
issues surrounding legislative and judicial balancing of these competing principles (put bluntly, 
child protection versus child participation) have been repeatedly raised by The UN Committee 
on the Rights of the Child.17	And yet, the rights enshrined in Article 8 of the Children’s 
Convention could easily be referred to—if not expanded upon—in domestic hearings to permit 
courts to look beyond the usual hard borders of family, nationality, and name. Arguably, they 
could cite these persuasive principles to include socio-cultural aspects more fully within their 
analyses of what ‘original identity’ might be comprised of. Article 10 might prove similarly 
useful, insofar as it appears to promote the reunification of estranged family members, by 
highlighting the need for regular contact between children and parents who ‘have been 
separated,’ even though its wording is of course much more suggestive of separations brought 
about by civil or political crises (territorial displacements, conflicts, genocide) or contentious 
private issues (marital separations, familial breakdown). 
The European Convention on Adoption (2008)18	(‘ECA’) seemed to embrace the spirit of the 
Children’s Convention by highlighting the importance of the voice of the child. The issue of 
making information available to adoptees was however tied to a policy of ‘age-appropriateness.’19 
Arguably, some ‘nuancing of the severing of all links’ (Horgan and Martin, 161) now exists in certain 
circumstances: blood-ties still remain key to parental duties of fiscal support or preventing marriages 
between genetic relatives. Article 10 of the ECA allows for alternative models of adoption (‘simple’, 
customary or de facto) that preserve biological links while Article 22 addresses the issue of balancing 
the privacy (i.e. ‘anonymity’) rights of relinquishing parents.20	And yet a wide degree of discretion 
is still afforded to domestic authorities: decisions on information release rest largely with national 
legislators and courts, who are only required to ‘bear in mind’ the provisions of Article 7 of the 
Children’s Convention, rather than having to actively or usefully embed it within domestic law or 
policy frameworks. Unlike the 1993 Hague Convention, Article 14 of the ECA does acknowledge that 
adoptive placements can be revoked,21  though it seems to assume that full integration (legal, social, 
psychological) into the substitute family is the preferred outcome: as such, non-disclosure vetoes 
and wide-ranging adopter discretion (e.g. on issues such as birth family contact) still hold sway. The 
ECA offers little guidance on how knowable ancestry might actually be achieved, providing merely 
that, where parentage is in dispute, ‘adoption proceedings shall, where appropriate, be suspended to 
await the results of the parentage proceedings. The competent authorities shall act expeditiously in 
such parentage proceedings.’22	Similarly, signatory states are encouraged rather than bound to enact 
specific, useful legislation that might favour those of us who search for our original kinfolk.
Guidance on the avoidance of origin deprivation and genetic kinlessness within the various 
UN Committee Documents remains fairly limited too. (Though non-binding in nature, the results 
of such international scrutiny at least offer some measure of censure for non-compliant signatory 
states.23) The Committee has reiterated the need to preserve links between children and their ‘own 
distinctive communities,’ noting how child protection systems should consider ‘indigenous culture, 
values and the child’s right to indigenous identity.’24	There is some disquiet over e.g. information 
vetoes, and the ways in which some children ‘born out of wedlock’ will simply never be able to 
16. See also Freeman’s (1996) comparative analysis of the lack of identity rights of donor gamete-conceived individuals as opposed to those of adult 
adoptees generally in open records jurisdictions such as the UK.
17. See for example the Committee’s Observations on Saint Lucia CRC/C/150 (2005) 10 para 66 which recommended that the views of the child be 
afforded greater consideration in decisions involving custody after parental separation; Islamic Republic of Iran CRC/C/146 (2005) 88 para 462 
which noted that the ‘best interests’ principle of the child is often completely side-lined in favour of custody decisions based upon the age of the 
child, and how this often tends to discriminate against mothers. 
18. Approved at the 118th Ministerial Session (Strasbourg) March 2008; adopted May 2008, opened for signatures November 2008. Available at 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/202.htm accessed 19.07.20 This effectively replaced The 1967 European Convention on 
Adoption which appeared to support harmonization of domestic laws on international adoption; no means of enforcement was created by the 
1967 Convention nor was it included in the Acquis Communautaire of EU member states. Sweden formally denounced the 1967 Convention in 
January 2003, whilst the UK partially renounced its provisions in June 2005. 
19. Article 5(a) of the 1967 Convention set out the suggested minimum level of ‘essential principles’ that signatory states should aim for in respect of 
domestic adoptions. These permitted but did not require secrecy in relation to the provision of medical information. 
20. See Article 22(3) which states that ‘The adopted child shall have access to information held by the competent authorities concerning his or her 
origins. Where his or her parents of origin have a legal right not to disclose their identity, it shall remain open to the competent authority, to the 
extent permitted by law, to determine whether to override that right and disclose identifying information, having regard to the circumstances 
and to the respective rights of the child and his or her parents of origin. Appropriate guidance may be given to an adopted child not having 
reached the age of majority.’
21. See for example the Irish High Court case A G v Dowse [2006] IEHC 65
22.  Article 16 (2008 Convention)
23. See https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRC/Pages/CRCIndex.aspx (accessed 18.07.20).
24. As the International Reference Centre for the Rights of Children Deprived of Their Family (‘IRC’) noted in respect of incidences of child 
abandonment in Islamic states, ‘the reasons … are very similar from one country to another; children born out of wedlock are the first victims of 
abandonment and they remain stigmatised throughout their life.’ IRC (2007:2). See further Bargach (2002)  and Ishaque (2008).




‘know the identity of their father.’25	Protection against the lingering social stigma of ‘illegitimate’ 
birth seems unlikely to be achieved solely via international law principles however, given the 
wider socio-cultural aspects of this particular form of ‘othering.’ Much of the jurisprudence on 
genetic identity rights seems to fall within the realm of ‘private law,’ not least its usual definitions 
on parentage, parenthood, and parenting. This is so even though The Hague Convention on 
Intercountry Adoption (1993)26	seems to speak to public law principles, by requiring States to 
compile ‘identity’ information on the ‘adoptable’ child, including ‘background, social environment, 
family history, medical history, including that of the child’s family.’ Although its Article 16 (1) 
(b) requires that ‘due consideration’ should be given to the child’s ‘ethnic, religious and cultural 
background,’ states are equally obliged to take care ‘not to reveal the identity of the mother and 
father, if, in the State of origin, these identities may not be disclosed.’27	Clearly, ‘no substantive norm’ 
(Stark, 68) attaches either to promises of confidentiality made to birth parents or to the practicalities 
of releasing information to their descendants. It is noteworthy too that the Hague Conference on 
Private International Law (‘HCCH’) (in assessing the impacts of Hague 1993 over two decades) 
recently found that ‘…some States noted that further work is required to preserve information 
relating to the origins of children and to allow adoptees to access this information with the 
necessary counselling and support’ (2015, 22).28 It was seen as significant also that ‘the Convention 
establishes only basic standards in relation to post-adoption services’ (2015, 20). 
As Anaya has stated, a ‘cultural integrity norm … requires diverse applications in diverse settings’ 
(104). It seems unlikely that a usefully detailed template for reparation or repatriation will arise in 
respect of lost or removed genetic ancestries.  As Oren has argued of disputed parentage scenarios 
(in respect of Argentina’s Abuelas atrocity), the rights of the child—and the remit of the best interests 
principle—may often be determined only after gauging which set of competing adults has the stronger 
‘parental rights claim’ (187). Where a loss of genetic identity has arisen through political upheaval 
or enforced cultural assimilation it might, hypothetically at least, be regarded as tantamount to 
rights-violating ‘inhuman or degrading treatment’ as was argued in connection with the Abuelas. 
Categorising origin deprivation as a civil or political rights issue (rather than a socio-economic 
one) would at least align the notion with powerful—often much more juridical—concepts within 
international human rights law. There is for example a clear duty upon states to actively enable 
identity protection under Article 24 of The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) 
(‘ICCPR’)29	which mirrors those found in Article 15 of The Universal Declaration on Human Rights 
(1948) (The ‘UDHR’),30	and Articles 9 and 4 (a) of The European Convention on Nationality (1997).31 
Article 9 of The Nationality Convention also refers to the recovery of lost nationality; ‘Each State Party 
shall facilitate, in the cases and under the conditions provided for by its internal law, the recovery of its 
nationality by former nationals who are lawfully and habitually resident on its territory.’ The wording 
of this provision seems to place a largely aspirational, non-interference obligation on signatory states 
to ‘facilitate’ rather than actively enforce or monitor the right to recover lost nationality, however. 
The right is further qualified by provisos on territorial residence and prolonged habitation, not to 
mention the inclusion of a reference to national laws. Such limitations are usually more associated with 
resource-dependant, socio-economic human rights such as the state’s duty to promote and protect 
respect for family life rights.32 Cultural heritage rights do often also tend to rely upon various ‘land-
based’ property aspects: place of habitation or birth, or tribal status via residence on Native land for 
example.33	This perhaps weakens the argument that a right to identity might be best conceptualised—
or realiplsed—as a political, rather than socio-cultural entitlement. Where a child has been conceived 25. See St Vincent and The Grenadines CRC/C/118 (2002) 101 para 437. See also Haiti CRC/124 (2003) 95 para 426, which highlights Article 306 of 
Haiti’s Civil Code, which makes it illegal for children born out of wedlock to learn the identity of their father; Luxembourg CRC/C/146 (2005) 
36 paras 184 and 185. See also Austria CRC/C/146 (2005) 47 paras 251, 252; Morocco CRC/C/132 (2003) 100 para 482; Syrian Arab Republic 
CRC/C/132 (2003) 116 para 554; Pakistan CRC/C/133 (2003) 37 para 210. Concern over the lack of guidance available to providing care for 
‘parentless’ children was evident too. See for example the Day of Discussion (2005) CRC Outline CRC/C/146 Annex II ibid para 4; See also CRC-
‘Children Without Parental Care’ (2005) Recommendations [CRC/C/156, Chapter VI]
26. The Hague Convention (1993)
27. Article 16 (2). See also The Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect of Parental 
Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children (1996) available at http://hcch.e-vision.nl/index_em.php?act=conventions.text&c
id=70 accessed 13.07.20 which contains some guidance on promoting the best interests of the child at domestic level. See Article 4 (b) however 
which specifically excludes ‘decisions on adoptions, measures preparatory to adoption, or the annulment or revocation of adoption.’ Article 6 (1) 
however does apply to ‘refugee children’, children who have been ‘internationally displaced’ and ‘children whose habitual residence cannot be 
established.’ 
28. https://assets.hcch.net/docs/f9f65ec0-1795-435c-aadf-77617816011c.pdf (accessed 18.07.20) Where non-signatory states are involved, bilateral 
agreements may be drawn up, which may – or may not – reflect the aims of Hague (1993). (para 12)
29. Articles 24 (2) and (3) of The ICCPR state that; ‘2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have a name. 3. Every child has 
the right to acquire a nationality.’
30. Article 15 of the UDHR states that ‘1. Everyone has the right to a nationality 2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied 
the right to change his nationality’. 
31. Article 4 (a) states that ‘everyone has the right to a nationality’ 
32. See Article 10 (1) of the International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights (The ‘ICESCR’) which states that ‘The widest possible 
protection and assistance should be accorded to the family, which is the natural and fundamental group unit of society.’ and Article 16 (3) of 
the UDHR which describes the family as ‘the natural and fundamental group of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State’.
33. See for example Re Bridget et al (Minors) [1995] BO93520 (The ‘Rost twins case’) where the question of whether or not the children 
possessed Pomo ancestry appeared to turn on the issue of paternal residence on tribal lands. 




or born in one jurisdiction but adopted in another for example it will be difficult to establish a right to 
genetic identity information by simply arguing the ‘right’ to name or nationality. Origin deprivation in 
such circumstances might result in ‘statelessness’ (as has occurred in some of the case law referred to 
in the second half of this paper).  
‘Identity’ rights are far from absolute therefore and will likely remain open to widely varying 
interpretations across domestic courts. In other words, possessing ‘a name’ (Article 24 (2) ICCPR) is not 
necessarily the same as being afforded unfettered access to original onomastic information or accurate, 
authentic birth/conception records. The right to ‘acquire nationality’ (Article 24 (3) ICCPR) similarly 
does not equal those rights which might arise by virtue of birth or knowable, evidenced ancestry. Loss 
of nationality seems increasingly subject to domestically drafted, rapidly changing sanctions (such as 
immigration laws).34 And yet, Article II (e) of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (1948) (‘The Genocide Convention’) promotes the right to ascertain one’s ‘national 
identity.’ Genocide included within its definition ‘forcibly transferring children of the group to another 
group.’ The wording suggests some degree of acknowledgement that genetic identity matters, both in 
terms of discovering and preserving it, and providing meaningful redress for rights violations (Stewart, 
223).35 The harms of identity loss have been acknowledged: indigenous adoptees in the United States 
have suffered ‘society… putting on them an identity which they didn’t possess and taking from them 
an identity that they did possess’ (Westermeyer, 1974).36 Conceptual framings of identity loss should 
therefore include its socio-cultural and civil or political aspects. 
Denials of cultural heritage may affect key rights to occupy or possess land, learn a language, 
practice religious belief, or hold tribal status. As Article 27 of the ICCPR states: ‘In those States in 
which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall 
not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own 
culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language.’37	The duty upon 
states to preserve ‘cultural integrity’—especially in relation to the rights of vulnerable minorities, 
‘parentless’ children, or displaced persons—seems an obvious one. As Anaya has further argued on 
cultural heritage rights, ‘While in principle the cultural integrity norm can be understood to apply 
to all segments of humanity, the norm has developed remedial aspects particular to indigenous 
peoples in light of their historic and continuing vulnerability (102).’ The wording of Article 27 (ICCPR) 
is however such that individual identity rights issues could easily fall outside of its protective remit. 
It appears to assume that certain groups will always possess essential knowledge as to the original 
identities—or whereabouts—of their ‘lost’ members, and that dispossessed adoptees for example 
might have some useful awareness of what their own cultural persuasion or nationality would have 
been had they not been relinquished and then affected by origin deprivation. Where individuals 
are denied truths through the lawful exercise of parental discretion, vetoes, or court decisions on 
information release or familial contact, provisions such as Article 27 (ICCPR) become ineffective, 
if not completely irrelevant. Harms in this context can quietly but profoundly affect individuals as 
private law matters, rather than being regarded as ethno-racial violations of collective, cultural 
heritage rights.38	In other words, they can be deemed both ‘necessary and proportionate,’ given how 
new bonds of social and familial kinship are meant to bring much-vaunted, protective ‘permanence’ 
to those who have been genetically abandoned or relinquished. In any event, it seems that a wider 
‘rights-based approach to children’s issues’ is gradually enabling a ‘decisive shift’ in domestic 
judicial attitudes towards the notion of children’s rights in general (McCarthy, 1) even though the 
jurisprudence in this area remains inconsistent. 
Whether a right to genetic identity should be framed as a ‘new’ right or not is still open to question. 
Newer rights may be vulnerable to resource dependency and lack the redressive urgency associated 
with older, more established rights (Cerda, 115–117).39Article 8 of The Children’s Convention—perhaps 
now more of a middle-aged provision rather than an adolescent one, in human rights terms—was 
aimed at fixing the ‘legal void’ that can prevent displaced or abducted children from reconnecting 
with their original families (Stewart, 222). As its Argentinean sponsor presciently observed at the 
time of drafting, meaningful implementations tend to require considerable willingness on the part of 
34. Provided that this has occurred in a ‘non-arbitrary’ fashion; See Article 15 (2) UDHR
35. This point, coupled with the argument that much harm can flow from loss of identity was central to the arguments of the Abuelas’ families. 
Stewart appears to suggest that a right of repatriation should not however be ‘absolute’ given that it might defeat ‘competing interests’. These 
are not defined but presumably might include conflicting parental rights such as privacy or familial autonomy or perhaps wider public interest, 
where the use of finite state resources would be involved e.g. in facilitating kin contact. 
36. Indian Child Welfare Programme ‘Hearings before the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs’ 
(1974) 93d Cong 2d Session 46 per Dr Westermeyer J
37. See also Pritchard (1998) on The Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No 23 (50) (Art 27) para 6.2 which suggests that Article 27 places 
a positive obligation on signatory states to actively protect ‘the identity of a minority.’
38. See for example the ‘traumas and identity conflicts’ arising in Serrano-Cruz Sisters v El Salvador Inter-American Court of Human Rights (March 1, 
2005) Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of March 1, 2005. Series C No. 120 para A (1) at page 13. On the American Convention on Human 
Rights generally, see Robertson and Merrills (1996) 
39. See also Stewart (1992–1993) who suggests that the right to identity under the Children’s Convention successfully conforms with Alston’s (1984) 
template for ‘new rights’ 




domestic legal systems to interpret their Convention obligations pro-actively (Cerda, 116). So, while 
cases involving cultural heritage or national identity losses are likely to involve calls for ‘displaced’ 
children to be repatriated, private law cases involving adoption or donor anonymity will not. They 
are likely to remain subject to tough veneers of political and judicial deference towards the sanctity 
of family privacy. As Brower-Blair has further noted, ‘current practices of the nations of the world 
regarding release of identifying information are not sufficiently uniform to support an absolute right 
to information under customary international law or general principles of law’ (643). She cites two 
key factors: a lack of international focus on the issue of disclosure and the use of judicial balancing 
exercises to determine when parental interests ought to outweigh the rights of the child. Whether the 
persuasive influence of international law principles might eventually bring about ‘the required level of 
recognition’ remains to be seen (660–661). The Council of Europe’s Joint Declaration on Intercountry 
Adoption (2008) appeared to acknowledge the difficulties faced by ‘parentless’ children: its Preamble 
stressed the paramountcy of child welfare by declaring that the ‘higher interests of the child must 
take precedence over any other consideration.’ It has placed a positive obligation upon signatory states 
‘to respond to the psychological distress of all their abandoned and orphaned children’ (para 4). It 
called also for consideration to be given ‘at European level’ to the setting up of an ‘adoption procedure 
based on the exchange of good practice between States.’ And yet, errors occurred: by amalgamating 
international law policies on intercountry adoption with those aimed at preventing child trafficking, 
for example, many ‘abandoned and orphaned children’ fell outside the remit of the law and were 
denied any ‘right to a family,’ remaining in long-term care. 
Such discrimination may occur even where national and regional charters have been ‘layered’ 
on top of one another in a bid to better incorporate basic human rights provisions into domestic 
law and policy (Diver, 2013). Quebec’s veto system for example is essentially at odds with the non-
discrimination provisions of The Canadian Charter,40	which require equality of treatment for all 
Canadian citizens irrespective of birth status. S.3 of The Canadian Human Rights Act (1985) similarly 
included “family status” as one of the prohibited grounds of discrimination.41 The Quebec Charter 
of Human Rights and Freedoms (1976) references socio-economic rights, with s. 10 providing 
that “every person has a right to full and equal recognition and exercise of his human rights and 
freedoms without distinction, exclusion or preference.”42	It stresses too that “discrimination exists 
where such a distinction, exclusion or preference has the effect of nullifying or impairing such a 
right.” The Quebec Charter’s careful drafting enables balancing exercises to be effected however 
in favour of preserving parental privacy. Although s. 5 guarantees the “right to respect for …private 
life” s. 9 clearly prioritises parental interests by proclaiming that “every person has a right to non-
disclosure of confidential information.”43 Wording matters: it is difficult to see how an adoptee might 
successfully plead that an unjustified interference has occurred in respect of either their identity or 
family life given the veto-friendly nature of the Quebec Charter.  Canadian NGOs have noted that 
the use of the non-disclosure veto does not appear to comply with the requirements of Section 15(1) 
of the Canadian Charter, Section 3 of The Canadian Human Rights Act or indeed Article 3 of The 
UN Children’s Convention, in preventing discrimination against adoptees.45 This is ironic given The 





The concept of genetic identity should not simply be dismissed as an irrelevant issue in court 
40. Section 15 (1) for example, guarantees that, “Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and 
equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, 
religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.” 
41. Section 3 of the Canadian Human Rights Act (1977) lists the prohibited grounds as ‘race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, age, sex, 
sexual orientation, marital status, family status, disability and conviction for which a pardon has been granted.’ 
42. The Charter’s Preamble also declares that ‘all human beings are equal in worth and dignity and are entitled to equal protection of the law.’ See 
further Gosselin v Quebec (Att Gen) [2002] 4 SCR 429, 2002 SCC 84 on violations of the Charter’s provisions.
43. S 52 also provides for general derogation from The Canadian Charter.
44. Quebec’s opposition has been well-documented with the Province’s federal government being the only one to avail of the Charter’s controversial 
‘notwithstanding’ clause to effectively achieve a degree of non-compliance in respect of other matters. Arguably, Quebec legislators were 
perhaps being mindful of France’s long-established practice of ‘accouchement sous X’ (anonymous birth). Though Quebec has recently ‘opened’ 
birth records – to an extent – the presence of a maternal veto on disclosure will prevent the release of any information (personal experience, 
February 2020).
45. See http://www.parentfinders.org accessed 12.07.20. The pressure group lobbies for legislative reforms on closed records and anonymity in 
reproductive and genetic technologies and drafts Recommendations on how compliance with the various provisions of human rights law might 
be better achieved.
46. Andrews v The Law Society of British Columbia [1989] 1 SCR 143 pp 174–5. See also the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal case of Shirley 
(Starrs) McKenna v Dept of the Sec of State (October 8 1993) T D where it was found that the provisions of the Citizenship Acts 1974-76 had 
resulted in discrimination against the adopted children of a Canadian citizen (in respect of its bar on jus sanguinis transmission of citizenship 
and ‘Canadian heritage’) pp 22 




proceedings involving the cauterisation of genetic ancestry. As Oren has argued (187) ‘competing 
versions of ‘best interest of the child’ are also competing versions of children’s rights.’ Linking 
genetic identity needs to ‘psychological integrity’ (Oren, 175) may yet come to be regarded as a 
particularly important aspect of child welfare paramountcy discourses, in both international 
and domestic law, given how a number of recent cases involving surrogacy have seen the best 
interests principles ignored or side-lined. 
3. Trends in recent case law: lessons for law and policy makers?
The concept of a ‘right to know’ is particularly relevant to the prevention of non-ancestry 
and origin deprivation (Colliver, 1995; Marks, 2006). Many cases involving genetic identity losses 
appear to turn upon the issue of whether child welfare paramountcy should take precedence 
over conflicting parental interests such as privacy, or indeed over government policies, on, 
for example, criminalising commercial surrogacy. Judicial discourses on the right to receive 
information tend to stress the importance of being able to obtain essential facts and truths. 
They reinforce the argument that basic legal norms and human rights standards ought to be 
adhered to and actively implemented at the level of domestic decision-making, even if only 
as baseline minimal requirements.47	As Colliver has further argued, ‘If national governments 
and institutions incorporate these standards into their laws or policies, they may be enforced 
through the national courts and other institutional mechanisms’ (43).
As the Family Court for England and Wales recently noted in respect of assisted 
reproduction, frequently ‘…the path to parenthood is ‘less a journey along a primrose path, 
more a trek through a thorn forest’ (2018).48 For the children ‘commissioned’ into existence 
by closed records adoption, surrogacy or anonymous gamete donation, the voyage towards 
authentic identity is equally—if not more so—beset with hazardous obstacles. As Cahn has 
noted,  ‘…the toxicity of internalized family secrets’ cannot be ignored, given how often such 
‘secrecy has an emotional component’ (1076). Being met with shame, stigma, or suspicion is a 
common feature of many searches for genetic relatives. As one international adoptee recently 
described her experience of trying to trace her original family: ‘I even went to one of their 
houses and begged, literally, on my knees. And they called the police on me.’ 49 
Such harsh ‘othering’ of origin-deprived persons can also be found within much of the recent 
jurisprudence on surrogacy and gamete donation. The issue of ascertaining, indeed creating, 
legal parenthood remains one of the most controversial aspects of family law (Carbone, 1295; 
Steiner, 2). Cases involving surrogacy seem to repeat the mistakes and varied cruelties of 
adoption practices from half a century ago, when the so-called ‘golden age’ served to spark a 
wide range of injustices.50	These often relied firmly upon the ‘politics of exclusion’ (Whitehead, 
55) which is still evident where cross-border, commissioned births are involved. Problems 
continue to arise in terms of law, ethics, and human rights: funding aimed at supporting those 
who search for their genetic family is increasingly fragile however.51 
In terms of state responses to the issue of surrogacy, there is a profoundly worrying lack of 
consensus amongst jurists and decision-makers. Modes of legal regulation range from a total ban, 
or criminalisation of non-altruistic acts, through to quiet acceptance of the practice, and a quite 
cheery promotion of profit-making ‘fertility tourism’ (Van Beers, 103). Academics have tended to 
highlight the profound human rights difficulties especially associated with surrogacy, arguing 
that it is harmful, and reminiscent of human slavery, thus meriting criminalisation (Lilienthal et 
al, 88). Clearly too, certain ‘regimes have played a part in creating reproductive black markets 
which have led to dangerous consequences’ for surrogates and children (Kriari and Volongo, 
353). Differing domestic approaches have led to a distasteful degree of ‘forum shopping’ which 
sees commissioning would-be parents skilfully evading the laws of one’s home jurisdiction (Ní 
Shúilleabháin, 105). Others have noted its similarity to both human trafficking (Lahl, 241) and 
‘womb-leasing’ (Harris, 137), given the existence of what essentially are ‘reproductive brothels’ 
(Corea, 276; Vijay, 210) made possible by reliance upon harsh property law models of human 
commodification and ownership (Field, 1155). Gendered, racial, and socio-economic inequalities 
47. See also The Dissenting Opinion of Judge a Cancado Trindade in Serrano-Cruz Sisters v. El Salvador. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment 
of March 1, 2005. Series C No. 120 ibid para a (1) at page 13, wherein he criticizes the Court for not taking the opportunity to create a useful 
precedent in respect of the child’s right to identity (para 13)
48. B (Adoption: Surrogacy and Parental Responsibility) [2018] EWFC 86, Per Theis J,  (citing Hedley J in re X and Y (Foreign Surrogacy) [2008] 
EWHC 3131 
49. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-06-12/womans-search-for-parents-leads-to-landmark-s.korea-ruling/12350896?fbclid=IwAR1kDN7LWbz
NITh6zo5a5jMcPRbqPP6Zm5Gm7RewhnhYDEK8yIO3lAk6iuQ (accessed 17.09.20) 
50. On surrogacy definitions see further Charrot (39) who frames it as ‘an arrangement between a woman who is going to bear the child (the 
surrogate) and a couple who wish that child to be "theirs" (the intended parents) whereby the surrogate undergoes artificial insemination in 
order to become pregnant, bears the child and then gives it up to the intended parents. [Where] …the surrogate’s own eggs are used ("traditional" 
or "partial" surrogacy) [occurs] otherwise (if the surrogate’s eggs are not used) [then] "gestational", "host" or "full" surrogacy [occurs]…and could 
involve the gametes of both intended parents, or the gametes (sperm/eggs) of one intended parent, plus those of a donor.’
  
51. See for example the situation in Australia https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-06-19/advocates-raise-concerns-about-international-
adoptees/9883704 (accessed 10.07.20) 




are evident too, (Tobin, 351), where a ‘language of property’ is invoked to determine questions 
or complex issues of legal parenthood (Maillard, 226). As Finnerty has further argued, the 
widespread presence of ‘legislative voids’ (83) compounds things further, creating an inconsistent 
‘laissez-faire approach’ (Vijay, 201). Often it then falls to domestic courts to decide the fates of 
genetically relinquished, potentially stateless vulnerable infants. 
And yet, human nature being what it is, domestic judges have also heard cases where 
surrogate mothers have changed their minds and hope to raise the ‘commissioned’ infant 
that they have carried.52	Not dissimilar claims have also been made by gamete donors 
wanting to have some form of contact with their biological children.53 As James (178) has 
observed, domestic jurists often perform complicated ‘legal gymnastics’54	to achieve equitable, 
compassionate outcomes, though these do not necessarily always result in decisions grounded 
in child rights principles (Fenton-Glynn, 2015, 37). Ireland’s Supreme Court recently highlighted 
the urgent need for reform of its domestic laws on surrogacy—and birth registration—on the 
basis that many ‘scientific and medical advances have far outpaced the use of existing legal 
practices and mechanisms.’55	Here, an altruistic and entirely amicable surrogacy agreement 
between two sisters sparked a legal challenge to Ireland’s birth registration policies. The 
lower court had originally permitted the child’s genetic mother (whose sister had acted as her 
gestational surrogate) to register herself as the child’s parent, which acknowledged the twin 
truths of the child’s genetic background and the ‘commissioning’ mother’s role as legal and 
biological parent. (In other words, her sister had carried the child for her, but she had used her 
own egg in the child’s conception, and it was always intended that she would be the child’s 
parent). The Irish Supreme Court overturned the lower court’s decision on appeal however, 
stating that any change to the law on surrogacy must come from legislators rather than judges, 
given how it ‘…affects the status and rights of persons, especially those of the children; it 
creates complex relationships, and has a deep social content. It is, thus, quintessentially a 
matter for the Oireachtas (Irish Parliament)’ (para 113).
As the High Court (for England and Wales) stressed in 2014, much ‘painful legal confusion 
…can arise when children are born as a result of unregulated artificial conception.’56 It was 
noted here that the need for ‘fairness’ demanded that the child’s circumstances (her conception 
and neonatal period) should be ‘reflected as accurately as possible amidst the adult discord.’57 
The court’s primary task was to ensure that any child so conceived might grow into ‘a happy 
and balanced adult …to achieve [her] fullest potential.’58 Significantly, in re B (Adoption: 
Surrogacy and Parental Responsibility) [2018],59 Theis J also noted that a child’s lifelong welfare 
needs are the paramount consideration. Here, the child—conceived abroad via surrogacy 
and anonymous egg donor—waited ‘in limbo,’ devoid of legal status. Though the father (both 
genetic and legal) had relinquished all interest in the child, refusing contact and ‘parenthood,’ 
the court still stressed that he was ‘part of B's identity and background.’ No mention was made 
however of the anonymous egg donor who was the child’s biological ancestor. Making an 
adoption order to resolve the matter, the court expressed the hope that this outcome might 
bring some measure of ‘lifelong security and stability’ to the child. It is perhaps most significant 
that the court mentioned the mother’s own adoptee status, suggesting that she was likely 
therefore to have a good degree of ‘sensitivity and understanding to B's background,’ and be 
very ‘aware of the issues that can arise.’
The courts expressed similar understanding of the difficulties of such cases in 2018, in the 
case of Z (Embryo Adoption: Declaration of Non-Parentage) for example, where, yet again, 
the commissioning couple’s marriage broke down soon after the infant’s birth, and the father 
essentially fled from legal paternity. The judge called upon parents and fertility clinics to avoid 
‘administrative falsehoods’ (arguably, including donor anonymity within this) and to pay heed 
to the potential legal position of any child who might be so conceived, given the many ‘medical, 
52. See for example A v B; re D (A Child) (Habitual Residence: Consent and Acquiescence) [2015] EWHC 1562 (Fam) 
53. See for example Re Z (A Child) (No 2) [2016] EWHC 1191 and re G (A Minor); Re Z (A Minor) [2013] EWHC 134 (Fam). The Irish Supreme Court’s 
decision in McD. -v- L. & Anor  [2009] IESC 81 offers a similar perspective, with the sperm donor father being refused a Guardianship Order but 
still permitted to apply for ‘access’ (child contact).
54. See also In the matter of Z (A Child) (No 2) EWHC 1191 (Fam) (20 May 2016) where the High Court (England and Wales) recently made a 
significant declaration of incompatibility (with the European Convention on Human Rights) in relation to s. 54 of the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 2008 (‘HFEA’), under which only couples (rather than single persons) were able to apply for Parental Orders. 
55. M.R. and D.R. -v- An t-Ard-Chláraitheoir op cit n 8, at para 113. ‘Constitutional claims’ to a right to parent have been upheld however in 
controversial contested adoptions. See for example N & Anor v Health Service Executive & Ors [2006] IESC 60 (the ‘Baby Anne’ case) where an 
adoptive placement was controversially overturned after two years. See also the UK Supreme Court in Re G (Children) [2006] UKHL 43 where 
it was held that courts making a welfare determination must evaluate parental ‘contributions’ which may be genetic, gestational or social/
psychological.
56. L v C (Applications by non-biological mother) [2014] EWFC 1 per Jackson J at para 1. See also M v F and H (Legal Paternity) [2013] EWHC 1901 (Fam) 
(on sperm donation) and JP v LP and Others [2014] EWHC 595 (Fam) which presented similar issues and difficulties.
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social and emotional reasons’ that underpin the very human need to seek out genetic truths.60	
An earlier case involving commercial, cross-border surrogacy (in Nepal, since banned)61	had 
similarly stressed the child’s long-term needs: only a Parental Order would serve here to ‘give 
him the lifelong security his welfare requires.’62	It seems fair to argue that even though genetic 
truths require and merit meaningful acknowledgement in law, policy and practice, they are 
often overlooked or side-lined in a bid to effect workable outcomes within the limited available 
domestic legal and conceptual frameworks on ‘relatedness.’
The jurisprudence on international surrogacy is particularly problematic, despite an 
increasing awareness of the need for genetic ancestry and authentic identity (Fenton-Glynn, 
2017, 555).63	Where states suddenly ban the practice of surrogacy, babies conceived and 
born abroad may suddenly be seen in law as stateless and/or parentless.64 Such deliberate 
‘orphanisation’—indeed active ‘othering’—can have profound impacts and implications. In 
Paradiso and Campanelli v Italy (2017)65 for example, an unmarried Italian couple entered 
into a gestational surrogacy agreement (with an anonymous egg donor) via a Russian fertility 
clinic. Because they then used inaccurate paperwork to bring their child back into Italy (where 
surrogacy is illegal) the authorities declared that the baby had been legally ‘abandoned.’ There 
was later found to be no genetic connection between the child and his commissioning parents 
even though they had argued that the father’s sperm had been used. The boy had spent the 
first eight months of his life with them, but was essentially ‘orphanised’ by being placed in a 
children’s home and then freed for adoption, with no further contact permitted between him 
and his parents from the point of his removal from them. The European Court of Human Rights 
found at first that the applicants had ‘acted as parents' towards the boy;66	the Grand Chamber 
overturned this on appeal, however. In terms of human rights violations, they found that only 
the parents’ basic right to respect for private life (i.e. their ‘decision to become parents’)67	was 
relevant here. The right to be afforded respect for one’s home and family life under Article 8 
of the European Convention was not engaged here, given, it seems, the absence of any genetic 
connection to evidence ‘relatedness.’ 
It is the Court’s dismissal of the child’s psychological connection to his parents that is 
perhaps of most concern: it serves to remind adoptees of the abhorrent practice of easy 
‘rehoming’ (a euphemism for re-abandonment) that seems to be becoming more widespread. 
They deemed it as essentially too brief to be significant, but it may be argued that the 8 months 
in question were in fact the child’s entire life at that point. Much emphasis was also placed 
upon the illegality of the parents’ acts, with the European Court granting the Italian state 
a wide margin of appreciation (discretion to interpret the Convention’s provisions). Clearly, 
they missed an opportunity to at least pass comment on the reasons behind Italy’s ban on 
commercial surrogacy (Ryan, 202) which surely would have been of interest to adoption 
scholars, human rights lawyers, and origin-deprived persons. Though the European Court must 
confine itself to matters of procedure, the ‘permeable line between procedure and substance’ 
was evident here. As Illiadou has noted, the Court made a clear ‘distinction between legitimate 
and illegitimate families’ which served to stigmatise those who are ‘illegitimate.’ (154).
As Ní Shúilleabháin further observed, the Court previously seemed loathe to intervene in 
matters of domestic policy involving such issues as bioethics (122). In the case of Mennesson v 
France for example, a married French couple successfully brought their commercial surrogacy-
conceived children home to France from the United States. The children subsequently suffered 
discriminatory treatment in terms of being denied nationality rights and liability for inheritance 
tax. The fact that they had a genetic connection to their father meant however that French law 
created a ‘contradiction between the legal and social reality’ and ‘undermined the children’s 
identity’ within their society (Pluym, 2014). As such, the best interests of the child were not being 
protected, and the private life element of Article 8 of the European Convention was deemed to 
have been infringed. It is noteworthy that, again, no interference with the right to respect for 
family life was declared. It may be argued that the human rights of the donor-commissioned 
child remain highly vulnerable to side-lining in such scenarios, especially where the ‘weightier’ 
interests of parents (privacy, reproductive freedoms) and wider society (Noon, 2020) must be 
60. EWFC 68
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protected.68	Vetoes on birth information, together with the practice of ‘anonymous births,’ do not 
sit well with Article 7 of the Children’s Convention (UNCRC) which was drafted to promote, if not 
protect, the right to know one's parents. The best interests of the child principle (in Article 3 of 
the UNCRC) cannot it seems require jurists, legislators, or parents to provide the vulnerable child 
with genetic identity or ancestral truths. This is so even though the loss of familial contact should 
only be deemed ‘necessary’ (under Article 8(2) of the European Convention) where ‘compelling 
reasons’ are found to exist (Doughty, 22). It seems fair to conclude that where blood-ties are 
absent—and the law is silent, equivocal, or inconsistent—domestic jurists will generally fall back 
upon common law rules of property ownership for guidance. Human rights principles (such as 
human dignity, equality of treatment and opportunity) are perhaps simply too vague or resource 
dependent to offer much scope for meaningful realisation of the right to (genetic) identity. This 
is so even though certain adoptee-relevant rights and interests (birth information, kin contact) 
are gradually becoming more juridical in nature.69	A ‘law of surrogacy’ seems unlikely however 
to coalesce any time soon into an articulate, child-centric rights framework, either at the level of 
domestic or international law.
As Cahn has argued, ‘...the law's tight focus on the parent-child relationship has left out legal 
questions relating to donor-conceived adults’ (1078). Similarly, the predominant ‘free market 
approach to reproductive questions’ suggests that economic laws and considerations will 
likely govern global reproductive markets for the foreseeable future (Van Beers, 133).  In the 
absence of profound infringements of fundamental rights, the Strasbourg court seems unlikely 
to make calls on—or even highlight the need for—a more coherent regulation of surrogacy law 
across Europe. All of this is relevant to those who are affected by closed records adoptions (or 
parental vetoes on information): if there is no consensus over the notion of a right to knowable 
genetic ancestry within gamete donation, it is unlikely that adoptees will be able to argue a 
fundamental right to access their own information. 
That said, there have been increasingly vocal calls for the establishment of ‘a human rights 
based system of international governance …based on three regulatory models: public health 
monitoring, inter-country adoption, and trafficking in human beings, organs and tissues (Shalev 
et al., 9). Malta IV for example declared that ‘legal parentage is an issue of international concern 
…a gateway through which many of the obligations owed by adults to children flow’ (para 
5).70	The concept of harmful, ‘limping parentage’ referred to in UN Documents is an entirely 
apt one, where children’s parentage is unknown—or rendered deliberately unknowable—and 
legal parenthood is slow to be allocated, confirmed, or created. The image of a wounded or 
otherwise incapable legal ‘creature,’ symbolises law’s struggle to keep up with the realities 
of a child’s situation: those of us who are origin deprived clearly all have genitors somewhere 
even where the law has held that we are not legally related to them, or permitted to know their 
identities or make contact. The law can be said to similarly trail behind scientific advances, 
especially where DNA serves daily to reunite separated kinfolk and focus public attention on 
our innate need to know our origins and make connections with those we resemble. At the 
risk of stretching the analogy too far, human rights may also be said to be shambling along in 
this area, given the lack of consensus amongst drafters and signatory states on pretty much 
all things to do with genetic relatedness and the need for open, accurate birth records. That 
said, the consequences of human exploitation (in terms of child trafficking or enslaving birth 
mothers and surrogates) are at least more widely recognised.71 The Hague Conference on 
Private International Law (‘HCCH’) for example recently noted the 
	 ‘significant	diversity	 in	national	approaches…	[which]	can	lead	to	conflicting	 legal	
statuses	across	borders	and	can	create	significant	problems	for	children	and	families,	
e.g.,	uncertain	paternity	or	maternity,	 limping	parental	statuses,	uncertain	 identity	of	
the	child,	 immigration	problems,	uncertain	nationality	or	 statelessness	of	 the	child,	
abandonment	including	the	lack	of	maintenance’	(para	4,	emphasis	added).72
In 2019, the HCCH stressed its commitment to a new Convention which would at least 
recognise the legality of foreign court decisions (on legal parentage), while a separate protocol 
would seek to govern international surrogacy. It is noteworthy that the practice of surrogacy 
70. The 2016 Declaration of the Fourth Malta Conference (“Malta IV”) on Cross-Frontier Child Protection and Family Law, avoided addressing 
the difficulties of surrogacy directly but still at least highlighted the need for the 1996 Child Protection Convention (and its international co-
operation mechanisms) to be better utilised.
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was neither denounced nor endorsed; intercountry adoptions were specifically excluded 
from its scope given that various human rights protections already (apparently) attach to it.73 
Significant also was the fact that sensitive terminologies are being discussed: ‘surrogate mother’ 
is too emotive, and might be better replaced by the phrase ‘surrogate woman’ or ‘surrogate.’ 
Such thinking does to an extent mirror those legal processes that similarly seek to remove or 
deny the importance or input of those with whom we share genetic material, wider ancestry, 
and living relations. Encouragingly for those of us affected by rights-denying, archaic rules 
on parental vetoes, there seems to be growing recognition of how domestic adoption policy 
often similarly ‘raises many important issues and challenges.’ Though this was not framed as a 
priority for the HCCH at present, the issue seems likely to be revisited later (2). 
There is some hope to be found also in how the stories of the origin deprived are finally 
being heard: in 2019 the UN took direct testimony from an NGO/support group for donor-
conceived and surrogacy-born persons (Donorkinderen). Their formal recommendations 
stressed an acute ‘need for urgent national and international measures’ including legal 
frameworks enabling a ‘right …to access information about their identity and origins …  [and] 
preserve relations with their biological, social, and gestational families’ (2019). Such calls for 
meaningful domestic law reform are relevant to those of us who were relinquished, adopted, 
denied by birth relatives, or prevented from accessing our own birth-right information. They 
clearly highlight how harmful intergenerational impacts can easily attach to non-origin. 
The Recommendations specifically ask that ‘comprehensive and complete records of all 
parties involved in the conception of the child be held by the State in perpetuity for future 
generations.’74   
Given that ‘tens of thousands of children’ (not to mention generations of adoptees, domestic 
and international) are still having ‘their rights denied’ (Allan et al, 2020), such calls for 
reform need to heeded by those jurists who hold the power to make or sever our ties of legal 
relatedness and links to genetic ancestry. For adoptees, it may yet be the case that some much 
needed guidance on the opening of sealed records—and the removal of vetoes—will flow from 
surrogacy reforms, if some level of consensus can be achieved e.g. on the nature of the harms 
arising from origin deprivation. The concept of adoption is clearly ‘no longer seen as a one 
dimensional triangulation of interests, but as a constellation of interests which can often span 
different countries’ with the child remaining as a fixed point, a ‘vulnerable party in a process 
conducted by adults’ (Horgan and Martin, 157). The same can be said of surrogacy and gamete 
donation, where deprivation of genetic origin can easily serve to entrench a lifelong sense of 
otherness and loss.
4. Conclusion
It seems fair to conclude that ‘the social landscape has shifted considerably’ since assisted 
reproduction first became possible (Wilmot, 232). As Storrow has argued, ‘a new illegitimacy’ 
(38) can easily serve to continue stigmatising new generations of children, by denying them 
accurate genetic information and any opportunity for contact with birth relatives. As Carbone 
suggests (in respect of surrogacy), parental actions, rather than those of the lawmakers, are 
perhaps the true key to achieving meaningful change: ‘Shortly after the child's birth, the 
parent or parents committing themselves to the child's future should join in establishing a 
permanent identity’ (1344). A similar rule could serve to protect origin-denied adoptees, if 
framed as a key element of the best interests principle. As Bauer has argued too, genetically 
relinquished children may be tied to wider society—and their parents—by a sort of ‘existential 
debt.’ Their existence is underpinned by unfair, perhaps illicit, processes that have rendered 
their fundamental human rights subordinate to those of other ‘triad’ members (2020) when 
it comes to accessing their own truths. Such blatant—and at times quite cruel— ‘othering’ 
surely amounts to unlawful discrimination, particularly when evaluated against a backdrop of 
human rights principles that are presumed to be grounded in fairness, equity, protection of the 
vulnerable, and the prevention of harms.
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